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In E.M. Forster's remarkable novel, A Passage to India, there is,
A
if my memory serves me, a brief but memorable scene.
businessman presents his card, which states his name and then his
degree as "B.A. Oxford (Failed)." Like the businessman in Forster's
wonderful cameo, there is a fascinating tendency in modern
international law to cite, as authoritative and even "binding," acts
that have not been legally completed, despite the fact that the
formalities of completion are explicit requisites for their legality. I
am not speaking of the wide variety of essentially non-authoritative
material that counsel and idealistic law students increasingly
rummage through and then assemble as proof that, thanks to the
sheer quantity they amass, a customary rule of law has formed.1 I
* Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School.

Prepared

for delivery as the Victor S. (Torry) Johnson Lecture, Vanderbilt University Law
School, Nashville, Tennessee, January 23, 2002. I acknowledge with gratitude the
assistance and editing work of Claudio Arag6n Ricciuto, Yale Law School 2004.
1.
Professor Brownlie has provided an extraordinarily generous road map that
is frequently followed in this regard. "The material sources of custom," Professor
Brownlie writes,
are very numerous and include the following: diplomatic correspondence, policy
statements, press releases, the opinions of official legal advisers, official
manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of military law, executive decisions
and practices, orders to naval forces etc., comments by governments on drafts
produced by the International Law Commission, state legislation, international
and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of
international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United
Nations General Assembly.
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am speaking instead of the-to me equally curious-practice of
international actors relying on acts that have manifestly and
intentionally not been made legal and binding according to the
procedures that have been prescribed for this purpose, as if they
were, nonetheless, legal and binding. In short, I am speaking of the
intentional use of, and the ascription of legal value to, a class of
unperfected legal acts by international tribunals and the
international constitutional implications of this practice.
Let me start with a non-judicial example that is still painful to
Americans. At 10:30 A.M. on November 4, 1979, Iranian militants
entered the Embassy and Consulate in Teheran and took the U.S.
diplomatic personnel hostage. 2 The United States rediscovered, as it
had many times before and since, that although it had the capacity to
destroy utterly an adversary, it did not have the capacity to make it
change its behavior. The U.S. Government quite simply could not
secure the release of its diplomats.
On December 31, 1979, the Security Council, on a U.S. initiative,
called on Iran to secure the release of the hostages, adding that it
would reconvene on January 7, 1980, to review the situation and, in
case of non-compliance, to "adopt effective measures under ... the
Charter. '3 As the hostages had not been released, the United States
submitted a draft resolution detailing a sanctions program. 4 Ten
members voted for the Resolution, but the Soviet Union vetoed it. 5
S/13735, like other vetoed resolutions, was dead.
Or was it? On April 7, 1980, with the hostage crisis going into its
fifth month, President Carter announced, among other actions
against Iran, the imposition of economic sanctions. 6 Part of the basis
of authority for his action was the vetoed resolution. The President
said: "[T]he Secretary of the Treasury will put into effect official
sanctions prohibiting exports from the United States to Iran, in
accordance with the sanctions approved by 10 members of the United
Nations Security Council on January 13 in the resolution which was

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (5th ed. 1998) (footnotes

omitted).
Such an open-ended formula is an alchemist's delight. For much like changing lead
into gold, this formula allows the juridical alchemist to take a lot of material, almost
none of which by itself creates legal obligations, and to heap it up in enormous, heavily
footnoted piles, until a magical Hegelian "nodal point" is reached whereupon what was
legal nothing becomes legal something, be it custom, a general principle or "soft" law.
2.

GARY SICK, ALL FALL DOWN: AMERICA'S TRAGIC ENCOUNTER WITH IRAN

228-30 (1986).
S.C. Res. 461, U.N. SCOR, 2184th mtg., Supp. Oct.-Dec. 1979, at 25, U.N.
3.
Doc. S/13671.
SICK, supra note 2, at 291-92.
4.
5.
Id. at 292.
6.
W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, The Legal Effect of Vetoed
Resolutions, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 904, 905 (1980).
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vetoed by the Soviet Union."7 The European Common Market
Foreign Ministers followed suit. On April 22, 1980, they issued a
dispatch that said, in relevant part,
The Foreign Ministers of the Nine, deeply concerned that a
continuation of this situation may endanger international peace and
security, have decided to request their national Parliaments
immediately to take any necessary measures, to impose sanctions

against Iran in accordance with the Security Council resolution on Iran
of 10 January 1980, which was vetoed, and in accordance with
8
international law.

A. legal act that was unperfected-according to the rules of decisionmaking in that forum-was being given a certain legal value.
Of course, the President's announcement and the communique of
the Common Market Ministers were political statements that by their
nature, try to maximize their authority by the use of whatever
symbols seem to promise effectiveness. No one seriously expects a
high degree of legal precision in such statements. One would expect,
however, that an international court or tribunal would be more
precise. Yet, there are circumstances in which the International
Court of Justice has found it convenient to ascribe full legal value to a
manifestly unperfected legal act.

I
Let us consider three examples from the jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice in which the Court relied explicitly on
an unperfected legal act. The first example is the recent decision of
the International Court in the "Case concerning Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain,"
in which final judgment was rendered in 2001. The territorial side
of this long-running dispute-which was also the longest before the
court--concerned a Qatari claim to an archipelago, known as the
Hawar Islands, that lies just off the east coast of the Qatar peninsula,
and a Bahraini claim to a region, known as Zubarah, on the east coast
of the Qatar peninsula just opposite Bahrain.' 0 Bahrain had held the
Hawars at least since 1939, when a decision by the British
Government based on authority assigned to it by separate treaties
with Qatar and Bahrain had confirmed Bahraini title on the basis of

Id.
7.
Id.
8.
9.
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. __ (Mar. 16), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm.
Id. 35.
10.
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long-term possession." For its part, Qatar had held Zubarah at least
since 1937 when it expelled the Bahraini inhabitants in a military
2
action.'
It seemed clear to observers of the Court that, consistent with
much recent international jurisprudence, the Court would not disturb
this long-standing territorial disposition, but would, most likely,
3
confirm Bahrain's title to the Hawars and Qatar's title to Zubarah.1
Finding a set of persuasive reasons for both legs of this decision,
however, proved difficult. Bahrain's title to the Hawars could easily
and persuasively be established by virtue of the authorized British
decision of 1939, which the Court confirmed. 14 The Court, however,
had more difficulty with regard to Zubarah. Bahrain adduced
evidence to show that the ruling family of Bahrain, the AI-Khalifa,
had originally come from Zubarah, and that even after they had
established themselves on the islands of Bahrain, they continued to
live on the peninsula, in Zubarah, for certain seasons. 15 Moreover,
the permanent inhabitants of Zubarah, members of the Naim tribe,
remained part of the Bahraini political system.' 6 In 1937, the ruling
family of Qatar, which had been steadily expanding its control over
the peninsula from its base in the then-village of Doha on the west
coast of the peninsula, raided Zubarah, killing many of the
inhabitants and destroying the settlement.' 7 While this effectively
ended Bahrain's presence on the peninsula, Bahrain contended that
the clear use of force by Qatar could not serve as the basis of
territorial title, the legal argument being that by 1937 international
law had disallowed conquest as a means of securing title to
territory.' 8 Qatar argued, as against this, that its de jure control of
all of the peninsula had been recognized since 1913, pursuant to a
"Convention relating to the Persian Gulf and Surrounding
Territories," concluded between the United Kingdom and the
Ottoman Empire. 19 The Convention established, in Article 11, a line
separating the Ottoman Sanjak of Nejd from the "peninsula of alQatar," 20 then stating:
The Imperial Ottoman Government having renounced all its claims to

the peninsula of al-Qatar, it is agreed between the two Governments

11.

12.
13.
14.

Id. 957.

Id. 9 55.
Id. T 147.
Id. T$ 128, 147.

15.
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.) 2001 I.C.J.__ (Mar. 16) 9 73-74, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm.
16.
Id.

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

75.
76.
80.
87.
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that the said peninsula will, as in the past, be governed by the Sheikh
Jasim-bin-Sani and his successors. The Government of His Britannic
Majesty declares that it will not permit the Sheikh of Bahrain to
interfere in the internal affairs of Qatar, to violate the autonomy of that
21
country or to annex it.

But the treaty was never ratified, so its evidentiary value was not

immediately apparent. Qatar argued that the treaty had never been
ratified because of the outbreak of the First World War and, not
entirely consistent with that argument, that Article 11 had been
incorporated in a treaty between the United Kingdom and the
Ottoman Empire in 1914 that was ratified-despite the First World
War. 22 Bahrain argued that the treaty was not ratified because a
"'complex set of interdependent proposals ... ultimately fell apart.' 23
Shortly after the negotiation of the first treaty, Ibn Saud had expelled
the Ottomans from the eastern coast of Arabia and the A1-Thani, who
had allied themselves with the Turks, had lost control over Doha,
while the Ruler of Bahrain had retained control over the northern
part of the Qatar peninsula. 24 In any case, the language of the 1914
treaty did not track that of the 1913 treaty.
The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. The
straight line in this case would have been to acknowledge that the
1937 seizure of the territory of Zubarah by the Al-Thani rulers of
Qatar and the expulsion of the Bahrainis had created Qatari title,
because at that time conquest was still a lawful means of acquiring
title to territory. Because these events transpired before the United
Nations Charter and because prohibitions on conquest then were
neither universal nor customary, this would not have been a startling
proposition. But it would have required a statement bordering on the
politically incorrect: that late in the days of the League of Nations,
title could still be acquired by conquest.
Instead of taking this course, the Court decided to rely on the
1913 Convention:
The Court observes that signed but unratified treaties may constitute
an accurate expression of the understanding of the parties at the time
of signature. In the circumstances of this case the Court has come to
the conclusion that the Anglo-Ottoman Convention does represent
evidence of the views of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire as to
the factual extent of the authority of the Al-Thani ruler in Qatar up to
1913.25

21.
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.) 2001 I.C.J. (Mar. 16) 87, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm.
22.
Id. 46.
23.
Id. 47.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. 89.
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The reasons for the Court's conclusion were, first, the clarity of
the text, 26 hardly a compelling reas6n when the question is lack of

ratification, and, second, the reference in the 1914 treaty, which was
ratified, to the line in Article 11 in the 1913 treaty. 27 The function of
the 1914 treaty, however, was different from its predecessor, and, in
context, the only point in the 1913 treaty that would have been
relevant to the 1914 treaty was the boundary of the Kingdom of Najd,
now Saudi Arabia, not the question of who was to have political
control on the Qatari peninsula.
Thanks to the validation of the unratified treaty, the court could
avoid the thorny question of whether acquisition of territory by armed
force in the period before the United Nations Charter could give rise
to good title jure gentium. "The actions of the Sheikh of Qatar in
Zubarah that year," said the Court, "were an exercise of his authority
on his territory and, contrary to what Bahrain has alleged, were not
' 28
an unlawful use of force against Bahrain.
The majority opinion may be contrasted with the approach
suggested by Judge ad hoc Fortier, who was, incidentally, appointed
by Bahrain but voted against Bahrain on this point. Judge Fortier
wrote that
the events of July 1937 can only be characterized as acts of conquest by

Qatar.

Bahrain has never acquiesced in the seizure by Qatar of

29
Zubarah ....
If the seizure of Zubarah, in 1937, by an act of force, were to occur
today, there would be no doubt, that it would be unlawful and
ineffective to deprive Bahrain of its title. The position now prevailing
and fully accepted in international law is that the use of force is
30
unlawful and, by itself, ineffective to bring about a change of title.
In 1937, however, the law was in a process of evolution and the
31
situation was not so clear.
During the oral pleadings, the Court was referred to the Fifth Edition
of Oppenheim's International Law, published in 1957, and the Ninth
Edition, published in 1992 (CR 2000/11, pp. 3941). In this last edition,
the authors, Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Robert Zatts, opined that it
should not be assumed that forcible takings of territories in the pre32
United Nations Charter days can be protested today.
The authors of the Ninth Edition conclude their comments with the
following observation. "This conclusion is fortified by the principle of

26.
Id. 90.
27.
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.) 2001 I.C.J. - (Mar. 16)
91, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm.
28.
Id. 96.
29.
Id. 35.
30.
Id. 36.
31.
Id. 37.
32.
Id.
38.
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stability which must be at least a significant factor in questions
concerning territorial sovereignty." I agree. 33

Accordingly, Judge Fortier concluded that Qatar had sovereignty over
Zubarah without having to rely on an unratified treaty. 34
My second example of the Court treating an unperfected legal act
as if it were legal is to be found in the Nuclear Tests Cases between
Australia and New Zealand, on the one hand, and France, on the
other. 35 France had begun to develop its own nuclear force de frappe
after the then nuclear powers, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the then Soviet Union, had agreed, among themselves,
to stop other states from developing nuclear arsenals while
grandfathering their own. 36
At that time, developing nuclear
weapons capability required atmospheric testing. 37 This requirement
forced democratic states to move their tests from their own territory
to the Pacific Ocean, as they appreciated that their own citizens who
were paying the costs of the tests would hardly do so if they knew
that they and their children were being irradiated in the process. To
keep their monopoly after they had concluded their own atmospheric
tests, the states that were the charter members of the nuclear club
concluded the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water. 38 This Convention
39
prohibited its parties from testing nuclear weapons over the oceans.
The idea was that if a nation could not test over the oceans, it could
not become nuclear. •
The treaty won wide subscription, but France, which had been
able to test in the Sahara as long as it had controlled Algeria, did not
become a party. After Algerian independence, France shifted its
testing to Muroroa atoll in the Pacific. 40 When Australia and New
Zealand, with wide Asian support, petitioned the court to enjoin
French atmospheric tests, the court issued a rather soft injunctionan "indication of interim measures," as it is called-on rather
doubtful jurisdictional grounds. 4 1 France ignored the injunction and
tested, only to find that it was being widely condemned, both within

33.
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.) 2001 I.C.J. - (Mar. 16) 39, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm.
34.
Id. 41.
35.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
36.
See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, Aug. 8, 1963, U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R., 2 I.L.M. 889, 889
[hereinafter Tests Treaty].
37.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 258 (Dec. 20).
38.
See Tests Treaty, supra note 36, at 889.
39.
Id. art. 1, § 1(a).
40.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 258 (Dec. 20).
41.
Id. at 259-60.
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and outside France. 42 The French government was increasingly
desperate for a way out of a situation that had become diplomatically
awkward and politically costly.
France found its escape hatch by repeatedly signaling that, after
this series of tests, it would no longer test in the atmosphere over the
oceans. On June 8, 1974, shortly before the annual tests series, the
Office of the President of the French Republic announced that
"France will be in a position to pass on to the stage of underground
explosions as soon as the series of tests planned for this summer is
completed. '43 On June 10, 1974, the French Embassy in Wellington,
after referring to the President's statement, stated:
France, at the point which has been reached in the execution of its
programme of defence by nuclear means, will be in a position to move to
the stage of undergournd tests, as soon as the test series planned for
this summer is completed.
Thus the atmospheric tests which are soon to be carried out will, in
44
the normal course of events, be the last of this type.

Just in case the message had not been received en clair, the President
of the French Republic, in response to a convenient and probably not
coincidental question at a press conference on July 25, 1974, said:
[Oin this question of nuclear tests, you know that the Prime Minister
had publicly expressed himself in the National Assembly in his speech
introducing the Government's programme. He had indicated that
French nuclear testing would continue. I had myself made it clear that
this round of atmospheric tests would be the last, and so the members
of the Government were completely informed of our intentions in this
45
respect ....

The Minister of Defense followed on August 16, during an interview
on French television, with a statement that the 1974 nuclear tests
would be the last in the atmosphere. 46 On September 25, 1974, the
Foreign Minister said the same thing in a speech to the General
Assembly. 47 Finally, on October 11, 1974, the Minister of Defense
held a press conference in which he reiterated the policy but dropped
the words "in the normal course of events" as a qualifier of the French
intention not to resume atmospheric tests. 48 A journalist in the
audience, who was either acutely observant or had been forewarned,
noted that the Minister had not used the qualifying formula that had

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 266 (Dec. 20).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 266.
Id.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 266 (Dec. 20).
Id.
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unilateral statements, and the
been inserted in some of the other
49
Minister agreed that he had not.

Now, the message was clear. France was willing to stop the
atmospheric tests in the Pacific, in return for which it wanted the
case in The Hague stopped too. But what was the legal value of
unilateral declarations, especially if France were later to decide that
its national security required it to resume nuclear tests? Could a
unilateral declaration create an obligation, akin to an obligation
created by a treaty? The Court thought so:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts,
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating
legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very
specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration
that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention
confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the
State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct
consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given
publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within
the context of international negotiations, is binding ....
Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; .. .the intention is
to be ascertained by interpretation of the act....
Whether a statement is made orally or in writing makes no essential
difference, for such statements made in particular circumstances may
create commitments in international law ....
[I]nterested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and
place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obligation
50
thus created be respected.
It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the
circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the
unilateral act must be deduced. 5 1

On the basis of these theoretical statements about the effect of
unilateral declarations in international law, the Court concluded with
respect to the French declarations that "the Court holds that they
constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect."' 52 Hence the Court

held, to the relief of France but to the disappointment of Australia
and New Zealand, that the Australian and New Zealand claims had
become moot. 53 The Court's judgment was crafted so skillfully that

readers may not have appreciated how revolutionary it was for
international law to state that oral statements by government
officials54 -until

then unperfected legal acts-could henceforth be

deemed binding.

49.
Id.
Id. at 267-68.
50.
51.
Id. at 269.
52.
Id.
53.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 269 (Dec. 20).
54.
The Permanent Court of International Justice, in an obiter dictum in the
Eastern Greenland case, expressed the view that a short handwritten note that the
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My third example of the International Court's reliance on an
unperfected legal act as nonetheless generative of legal rights is the
interesting maritime boundary dispute between Libya and Tunisia,
decided by the Court in 1982. 55 Each party developed a host of
arguments, but the Court was particularly interested in what it
called a tacit modus vivendi between France and Italy, when they
ruled, respectively, Tunisia and Libya. 56 The modus vivendi, which
ran along a forty-five degree angle to the section of the coast where
the land boundary began, had, as its initial function, to obviate
incompatible fishing claims that had been generating disputes and
57
incidents between the two colonial powers.
Now, a modus vivendi is a quintessential unperfected
international legal act. It is, as Satow put it, "the title given to a
temporary or provisional agreement, usually intended to be replaced
later on ....
-58
It is genetically non-binding; indeed, its whole
function is to suspend conflict over whatever is the subject of the
modus vivendi in order to permit the parties to interact peacefully
and productively, pending the settlement of the matter.
The International Court, itself, had acknowledged the difference
between a binding agreement and a modus vivendi. In Iceland
Fisheries,the court had said that:
The interim agreement of 1973, unlike the 1961 Exchange of Notes,
does not describe itself as a 'settlement' of the dispute, and, apart from
being of limited duration, clearly possesses the character of a
provisional arrangement adopted without prejudice to the rights of the
Parties, nor does it provide for the waiver of claims by either Party in
59
respect of the matters in dispute.

"[A] modus vivendi arrangement," Judge Evensen wrote, "basically
implies two elements, namely, that the modus vivendi arrangement is
provisional pending a solution of the disagreement and that the
arrangement is non-prejudicialfor the two Parties." 6 0 It is, in short,
an unperfected legal act.
Yet in Libya/Thnisia, the Court ascribed a legal value to this
unperfected legal act. On the one hand, the Court said:

Norwegian Foreign Minister, Count Ihlen, wrote in the course of negotiations and
passed across the table to his Danish counterpart, created a binding obligation on
Norway.
55.
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982
I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24).
56.
Id. at 56-57.
57.
Id.
58.

SATow's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 262 (Lord Gore-Booth ed., 5th ed.

1979).
59.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 18 (July 25).
60.
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis/Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 306 (Feb.
24) (Evensen, J., dissenting).
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The Court considers that the evidence of the existence of such a modus
vivendi, resting only on the silence and lack of protest on the side of the
French authorities responsible for the external relations of Tunisia,
falls short of proving the existence of a recognized maritime boundary
between the two Parties. Indeed, it appears that Libya is not in fact
contending that it had that status, but rather that the evidence that
such a line was employed or respected to a certain extent is such as to
deprive the ZV 45 line of credibility. 61
The Court, however, went on to say:
But in view of the- absence of agreed and clearly specified maritime
boundaries, the respect for the tacit modus vivendi, which was never
formally contested by either side throughout a long period of time, could
warrant its acceptance as a historical justification for the choice of the
method for the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two
States, to the extent that the historic rights claimed by Tunisia could
62
not in any event be opposable to Libya east of the modus vivendi line.
Thus, the Court ascribed a legal value to an act that was, by its
nature, unperfected.

II
Let me return to Forster's little cameo in A Passage to India with
which I opened this lecture. We were all amused by the businessman
whose card announced that he had failed to win his degree at Oxford.
But consider the beam in our own eyes. The number of curricula
vitae of prominent people that recite, as an achievement, nomination
for a Nobel Peace Prize. In Forster's language, that would read
"Nobel Peace Prize (not awarded)."
The number of book
advertisements that announce proudly that the book being hyped was
nominated for a Pulitzer Prize or the number of cinema
advertisements that recite that the film being extolled received three
nominations for Academy Awards. In Forster-speak, these would
read "Pulitzer Prize (denied)" or "Academy Award (bestowed on a
better film)."
We do not smile when we encounter these quotidian examples,
because we appreciate that even a nomination in an intense
competition is a distinction in its own right, tells us something about
the relative worth of a person or an entry, and distinguishes them
from the many others who did not achieve even this "also-ran" status.
Indeed, in his context, Forster's businessman had an achievement
worth advertising: he had been able to study enough to be admitted to
Oxford, to study there, and to progress far enough to sit for the
exams. He or his family had been able to afford that considerable

61.
62.

Id. at 70.
Id. at 70-71.

740

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:729

expense. In his personal calculus, all that seemed, on balance,
worthy of publicizing rather than concealing, even though the price of
doing so was to acknowledge that he finally flunked.
Unperfected acts in international law resemble these examples
but are also different from them in important ways. An unperfected
act may have important political, historical, or geographical
information in it. It may, as with the abortive Iran sanctions
resolution, testify that all but one member of the Security Council,
the executive committee of the international community, had
concluded that the gravity of the Iranian action that had precipitated
the initiative warranted the imposition of the sorts of sanctions that
the United States had proposed. It may, as the International Court
said in Qatar v. Bahrain, "constitute an accurate expression of the
understanding of the parties at the time of signature.163
A
genetically unperfected act such as a modus vivendi may, as the court
said in Libya/Tunisia, be a "relevant circumstance" in validating a
maritime boundary line." 4 A hitherto unperfected act such as a
unilateral statement by a government official, which has not been
made into an international agreement or undergone internal
ratification procedures, may nonetheless indicate the firm policy of
the state whose representative has made it.
In this respect, unperfected international legal acts are worth
the attention of historians and legal scholars.
For those legal
scholars who view law not as a body of rules but as a set of
expectations shared by politically relevant actors-and I include
myself in that group of scholars-unperfected acts may, indeed,
contain data that are useful if not indispensable to determining what
those expectations are, especially if they have not been confirmed in
formal legal instruments.
All these uses certainly enrich our
conception of the legal process even as-or perhaps precisely
because-they blur, smudge, and even erase the line between
perfected and unperfected acts in international law.
There is a price to be paid for this blurring and smudging,
however, when international courts and tribunals engage in it. Lines
and boundaries that demarcate perfected-and hence binding-acts
from unperfected-and hence non-binding-acts are, I submit, as
important in law as those that demarcate the sacred from the profane
in religion.
In international law, an unperfected act is not a
pathological feature that is to be repaired or perfected as quickly as a
court seized of the case can. It is part of a class of quite specific tools,
designed to secure important policies that are served by the very

63.
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. _
(Mar. 16), available at http://www.icjcji.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm.
64.
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahirya), 1982
I.C.J. 18, 56-57 (Feb. 24).
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unperfected quality of the acts concerned. Take the modus vivendi.
A modus vivendi is an agreement that is not binding, and even
though it may be inconsistent with the claims of one or both of the
states, it does not prejudice those claims. It operates for a period of
time, and then lapses, or it may be denounced on short notice by
either party. It is thus a type of genetically unperfected act that
allows the diplomat and government official to stabilize a difficult
issue dividing two states without having to decide it. When President
Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney were trying to conclude the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the precursor to NAFTA,
among the issues that they found most difficult to resolve was that of
subsidies for softwood lumber.6 5
So, in a memorandum of
understanding, they created a short-term modus vivendi-without
prejudice to either of their claims on the softwood lumber issue-that
permitted the CFTA to be concluded and to begin to generate its
anticipated benefits.6 6 They hoped and assumed that the benefits
would be large enough to reduce the softwood lumber issue from what
had been a "deal-breaker" to an item that had to be resolved, lest all
the benefits now flowing from the agreement be lost. In many
situations, disputes that are not immediately soluble, but whose
continuation jeopardizes many other collaborative activities, can be
managed by means of the modus vivendi-but only insofar and as
long as there is a consensus at the international constitutive level
that a mnodus vivendi does not prejudice claims, generate rights, nor
serve as the basis for a claim of estoppel or preclusion.
When the International Court of Justice assigned an evidentiary
value to the Franco-Italian modus vivendi by treating it as a
"relevant circumstance," it was not per se unreasonable, in the
context of that case. 6 7 Certainly, a scholar or historian studying the
diplomatic relations between France and Italy in North Africa and
then between the successor states of Libya and Tunisia would have
included the modus vivendi as one of the factors contributing to the
stable and peaceful relations in the maritime area between the
governments over more than half a century.
In making this
seemingly innocent inference, however, the International Court, as a
court, undermined, at the international constitutive level, the
essential and indispensable characteristic of the modus vivendi and
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thus removed an extremely valuable tool from the tool box of
diplomats and international decision makers. Prior to 1982, any of
us, as legal advisers to governments, could have explained to our
political counterparts the utility of a modus vivendi in a particular
dispute. We could have assured our clients that there was no danger
of an international legal tribunal interpreting the modus vivendi as a
waiver of rights. I am not sure we can do so any longer.
The International Court was faced with another unperfected act
in Qatar v. Bahrain, in this instance an unratified treaty. 68 It is
always difficult to craft a majority judgment in a cameral tribunal,
especially one containing seventeen judges. Different judges have
different perspectives, held with differing degrees of intensity; the
person charged with drafting the judgment must somehow
accommodate them, lest they withdraw their support and write a
dissent. This sometimes constrains the drafter to narrow and not
necessarily especially plausible reasoning, a judicial species of finding
the lowest common denominator. For this reason, majority decisions
rarely attain the coherence and internal logical force of dissenting
opinions. In Qatar v. Bahrain, one would assume that a significant
number of judges who were disposed to join the majority would not
state that as late as 1937 conquest was still a perfectly valid way of
securing title jure gentium. So I assume that the drafter of the
judgment had to search for an alternative ground for decision that
would be acceptable to the provisionally-assembled majority.
Reliance on an unratified treaty seemed to fill the bill.
Historically, the constitutive rules of international law viewed
unratified treaties as unperfected acts that generate no rights or
obligations. The only function of the signatures of the negotiators
was to authenticate the text that had been agreed upon. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties purported to "progressively
develop" this dimension of treaty practice by going beyond customary
international law and imposing an obligation on a signatory to act in
such a way as not to frustrate the object of the treaty until such time
as the signatory had decided not to ratify the treaty. 69 Otherwise, the
Vienna Convention affirmed the need for ratification for a treaty to
enter into force when the instrument itself indicated that ratification
70
was necessary.
The International Court did not say anything unreasonable
when it observed "that signed but unratified treaties may constitute
an accurate expression of the understanding of the parties at the time

68.
See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
(Mar. 16), available at http://www.icjBahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. _
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm.
69.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18(a), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
70.
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of signature."'' l They may indeed, and diplomatic historians may
certainly examine them for that purpose. When an international
tribunal assigns them legal value despite their non-ratification,
The
however, there is a prospective constitutive consequence.
flexibility that a negotiator enjoys in experimenting with different
packages of concessions in order to strike a consensus with the other
party is reduced, for henceforth the negotiator must assume that
whatever he or she writes ad referendum may be used against his or
her state, even without subsequent ratification. Nor are the adverse
consequences limited to the international sphere. Ratification of
treaties in republican systems such as that found in the United
States is a critical bulwark of separation of powers and checks and
balances. If the international legal system henceforth assigns legal
validity to unratified treaties, that bulwark will be breached.
Nor did the International Court of Justice rule unreasonably
when it held in Nuclear Tests that "declarations made by way of
unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the
effect of creating legal obligations." 72 It was clear that France was
signaling-one might say desperately-that it would desist from the
atmospheric tests if the court would desist from proceeding to a
judgment condemning it. 73 For different reasons, the Court's own
situation was no less desperate, for it had issued an order that had
Therefore, a judgment that treated the French
been ignored.
statements as binding was as convenient for the Court as it was for
France. But because whatever a court does is perforce precedential,
the scholar must question the constitutive effect of transforming
unilateral statements by heads of state into potentially binding
obligations and assigning the constitutional competence to make such
a determination, on a case-by-case basis, to the International Court of
Justice.
On the one hand, the judgment seems to be a triumph of
substance over form. After all, what is important, as the Court said,
is the intention to be bound. In early English law, a contract could
not be concluded until a peppercorn was exchanged between the
parties. At a later stage, some manifest form of consideration was
required or the putative agreement required a seal. At a still later,
and we like to believe higher, stage of development, these tangible
manifestations of intention to be bound were shed in favor of a
sophisticated examination of the intentions of the parties. Was not
international law merely catching up here?

See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
71.
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. __ 84 (Mar. 16), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267 (Dec. 20).
72.
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In a sense, international law was. But the abandonment of
highly standardized and ritualized forms for indicating when-and
precisely when-states have locked themselves into binding
international legal obligations has the potential of chilling the
freedom of negotiation, the use of trial balloons, the testing of
experimental language, and the many other techniques that
government officials use to interact with their counterparts in other
governments and to move cautiously toward commitment. The
Court's planned obsolescence of binding formalities and its
substitution of itself as the judge of states' intentions may well have
fit in France's case. If one believes, however, that the systemic
capacity that allows actors to talk without danger of commitment as a
way of exploring alternatives is important for international politics,
the constitutional change necessary to accommodate the French case
could carry a steep price tag in many, many others.
Nor were the United States and the European Foreign Ministers
saying something unreasonable or unethical when they noted that a
majority of the Security Council-and probably a majority of the
General Assembly-agreed that the Iranian action was so grave a
threat to peace that effective measures should be taken. There are,
however, rather far-reaching constitutive consequences to saying that
a majority per se carries a binding legal authority, even if, under the
formal rules of the arena, that actual majority was not sufficient to
have created a binding resolution. Imagine a chairman saying, "A
two-thirds majority is required. Because we are just short of a twothirds majority, the measure passes." In the Iranian case, an even
more important policy may have been compromised. The contextual
function of the liberum veto was to maintain a congruence between
the authoritative decisions of the Security Council and the realities of
the world power process. While it may have seemed useful to give a
special authority to that particular vetoed resolution, the systemic
consequences of a constitutional change could have been grave,
especially when the prospective change was neither identified nor
debated in terms of its constitutional implications.
Some of the classic policies that are reflected in demands for a
sharp distinction between perfected and unperfected legal acts go to
the very heart of international law. Consider the issue of sovereignty.
The fact that states, in fashioning the international legal system over
many centuries, have been extremely careful and restrictive about
how they will be bound legislatively is frequently characterized as an
"obsession" with sovereignty.
That is mistaken.
There is a
fundamental ethical and moral basis to the international requirement
that a state and its people are bound only by the treaties to which
they consent and the rules of customary international law followed
widely and out of sense of legal obligation. As in any democratic
system, members of the community are not to be subjected to law, in
the form of legislation of which they have not participated or to which
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This is why states, and especially
they have not consented.
democratic states, are so careful about these essentially
constitutional rules about international law-making and why treaties
and state practice have to be studied so carefully before concluding
that a new customary rule exists.
It is also why it is so inappropriate, if not morally offensive, in
international law to purport to "discover" new rules of customary
international law by innovative joinders of provisions of dissimilar
instruments, elaborate exercises of logical derivation, and feats of
deconstruction that could leave the likes of Jacques Derrida green
with envy, and why it is so inappropriate to collect and heap up a
mass of scholarly statements of aspiration as if they were law, on the
naive assumption, of many children and some adults, that if you
repeat a wish enough, it will become true. These gimmicks are
particularly disturbing when they are used in the growing area of
international criminal law. This is not to say that I, as a citizen,
would not approve of the passage of some of the policies pursued in
such entrepreneurial law-making exercises. As a jurist, expected to
focus on the abiding constitutional structures of the community,
however, I am troubled and even offended by these entrepreneurial
law-making efforts.
The point common to all of these examples is that the
requirements for perfecting a legal act, whether in international law
or in a domestic legal system, are not empty technicalities but are,
themselves, based upon important policies. When they are not or
when the policies are obsolete, then, of course, the formalities should
be discarded. Cessat ratio, cessat ipse lex.74 To insist upon retaining
the technicalities when they no longer serve a purpose would
transform international law from a rational and purposive system for
achieving optimum social goals within minimum world order into an
obsessional neurosis. But when policies served by the technicalities
are still important for the community concerned, to dismiss them to
satisfy some other urgent issue will not be without cost. So let us
remember: the technicalities of perfected law-making ensure the
certainty as to what is and is not law. These technicalities reduce the
possibility of applying law ex post facto, which undermines one of the
struts of the legitimacy of law and when it is applied in a criminal
law setting, breaches one of the fundamental moral compacts integral
to a Rule of Law system. The technicalities of perfected law-making
also prevent harassment of citizens by the legal apparatus, a
technique dear to fascism.

74.
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III
I have expressed concern at the increasing reliance on
unperfected legal acts in adjudicative settings. I am not, however,
suggesting that the baby be thrown out with the bathwater. The fact
legal
vital
information-possibly
that
important
remains
information-is often to be found in unperfected legal acts, much as
vital information for medical research may be found in stem cells.
The international legal system, like the legal and ethical systems of
advanced science-based and technological civilizations confronting
stem cell research, will have to develop a hermeneutic both to
optimalize the values of formalities while allowing examination of
unperfected legal acts for information about the formation of new
international law. For though I contend that the formalities that
signify the perfection of a legal act have important ethical and
efficiency values, I am not arguing for a return to a strict formalism
that insists upon a sharp distinction between perfected and
unperfected legal acts.
One of the features of the international social process is, on the
one hand, its extraordinary complexity and rapid change,
characteristics that underline, wherever they manifest themselves, a
constant need for law. On the other hand, a complementary feature
is the rather primitive level of articulation and development of the
institutions and practices for making and changing law and
terminating legal arrangements that have become obsolete. In these
circumstances, an insistence on strict formalism would disserve and
could even undermine public order, which is the sine qua non of law.
Many of the efforts to ignore formal requirements and to rely upon
manifestly unperfected acts, including the rise of so-called "soft law,"
are both symptoms of international law's structural problem of lawmaking and efforts to solve or circumvent it. Those who care deeply
about values become frustrated with the often glacial pace of
international legal response and seek short-cuts. 75 I confess that, at
times, I have proposed some possible solutions that themselves blur
the classical distinction between perfected and unperfected

Consider, for example, codification treaties. Codification treaties are
75.
treaties that purport to codify, in treaty form, a body of theretofore customary
international law. If particular rules of customary international law were already
binding on all states, then the act of their codification in the form of a treaty which is
then to be ratified should not deprive the rules in question of their binding character
even though the treaty in question never comes into force or, if it does, even though a
particular state never adheres to it. In theory, this form of unperfected act does not
seem problematic, but the impression is misleading, for codification exercises often
incorporate some so-called "progressive development," one of international law's
euphemisms for legislation.
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international legal acts. 76 But the search for solutions to a persistent
structural problem of international law should bear in mind the
policies that underpin the requirements of formality in law and the
costs of disregarding them. Proposed solutions that seek to address
the need for a more rapid and flexible international law-making
should accommodate those enduring policies as much as possible,
insofar as those values are still important for the world community.
In international law's sociology of knowledge, unperfected legal
acts are routinely examined and assigned some legal valence.
Scholars quite properly use such material to assess incipient changes,
and treatise and monograph writers are expected to determine
whether some unperfected legal material is, or is in the process of
becoming, customary international law. This is a perfectly proper use
of unperfected legal material, because one of the functions of the
scholar is to anticipate trends and to appraise incipient developments
in terms of the impacts they may have on the most important goals of
the international system. The most acute problem with unperfected
legal material occurs when judges and arbitrators purport to rely
upon it. It is vital that they appreciate that when they are
performing the role of judge or arbitrator, there are constitutive
implications to their actions that transcend the case they are
deciding. Hence they must use a different set of legal tools. Scholars
may cautiously reconstruct unperfected legal acts in international
law. Judges and arbitrators, I submit, should not.

76.
See generally W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLawmaking: A Process of
Communication, Lasswell Memorial Lecture, American Society of International Law
(Apr. 24, 1981) in 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 101 (1981).

